In 1994 the Federal Reserve System moved to a more transparent reporting of monetary policy. In this paper we first discuss the evolution of Federal Reserve transparency in U.S. and second we test its effectiveness. We assess the empirical impact of monetary policy transparency on the uncertainty about future monetary policy using T-bill rate forecast dispersions from the Survey of Professional Forecasters as a proxy for monetary policy uncertainty. We use three statistical methodologies: descriptive statistics, single regression equations and a vector autoregressive model. The empirical findings confirm that Federal Reserve transparency has reduced the uncertainty of future monetary policy anticipated by market participants.
Introduction
Chairman Greenspan (2004) in his address to the American Economic Association argued that the Federal Reserve's experiences over the past two decades" make it clear that uncertainty is not just a pervasive feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the defining characteristic of the landscape" (Greenspan (2004, p.36) ). Further elaborating the notion of monetary policy under uncertainty, at the Fourth Conference on the
International Research Forum on Monetary Policy, Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors Donald L. Kohn (2006) discussed in detail the role of uncertainty and its influence on the formulation of monetary policy.
In this paper we discuss (1) how the Federal Reserve Bank under the Chairmanship of Alan Greenspan took several initiatives to reduce uncertainty about future monetary policy by becoming more transparent. We, then (2) assess the empirical impact of monetary policy transparency on the uncertainty about future monetary policy using Tbill rate forecast dispersions from the Survey of Professional Forecasters as a proxy for monetary policy uncertainty.
Central Bank Transparency
In view of the fact that the Fed has been given enormous economic responsibilities to preserve price stability and promote economic growth, the question naturally arises as to how the Fed should exercise its responsibilities in a democratic society guided by institutions of freedom and accountability. Academic economists and policy makers agree that the Fed's accountability for its actions to preserve low inflation and promote economic growth is best expressed in its degree of transparency.
The standard definition of transparency is the commitment of the Central Bank to provide reliable, complete, and timely information to the widest possible audience. A more theoretical definition of transparency that is widely used in the literature is the lack of asymmetric information between monetary policy makers and economic agents. This is equivalent to saying that transparency describes the presence of symmetry of information between policy makers and economic agents.
Transparency has multiple attributes each of which is essential to maintaining the meaning of the concept. Thus failure to provide information, providing unreliable information, providing it in an untimely way, or providing information that is abstruse or difficult to understand violates the integrity of the concept. These issues are discussed in detail in Ferguson (2001 ), Carpenter (2004 , Issing (2005) Haan et al (2007) .
Historically speaking, transparency as it relates to monetary policies of the Federal
Reserve and Central Banks around the world was not a top priority. In fact for a long time, the actions, policies and objectives of central banks were shrouded in secrecy. The change in approach is due in part to the recognition by central bankers of the economic benefits of more transparency about the design, procedures, and tools employed in carrying out the policies.
In the U.S, there has been an evolution in the practice of transparency at the Federal Reserve. This evolution can be separated into two multiple dimensions. With regard to transparency concerning policy objectives, the road began with the Freedom of Information Act, which took effect in 1967. As a result of this act, FOMC began to publish the proceeding of the minutes of the Fed meetings. However, the minutes were divided into two documents. One was called the Memorandum of Discussion, which was released after a five-year lag. This document identified the speakers and contributors, but was not a verbatim transcript. The other was a shorter document called the Record of Policy Action, which was released with relatively little delay. This document provided a summary of the committee's deliberation and discussion but did not identify which FOMC member took which position.
In 1979, in response to a court suit challenging the legality of delay of the release of the Memorandum, the FOMC discontinued its publication. The FOMC continues to publish the Record of Policy Action but in 1993 changed its name to "Minutes of FOMC Meetings." Over time, the release lag of this document was shortened and currently is available two days after the next scheduled FOMC meeting. 
Empirical Assessment of Impact of Monetary Policy Transparency
Having briefly discussed the concept of transparency and its recent evolution in the U.S.
we next investigate empirically its impact. There is only a small set of empirical papers since the implementation of Fed transparency is only about 12 years old. Carpenter (2004) reviews few of these empirical studies.
In our empirical investigation, as a proxy for the various sources of uncertainty about future monetary policy we use the forecast dispersions for T-bills from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). We use these data for three reasons.
First, since the T-bill rate closely tracks the Federal funds rate, it seems plausible that forecasters of the T-bill rate are essentially attempting to forecast future monetary policy. The second reason is that survey based forecasts predict well. Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2006) provide detailed evidence about the relative performance of four alternative methods of forecasting out-of-sample inflation in the U.S.: time series ARIMA models, regressions using Phillips curve modeling, term structure models that include linear, nonlinear and arbitrage-free modeling and survey-based measures. They find that survey forecasts outperform the other econometric methods.
The third reason we use T-bill data is that the Survey of Professional Forecasters provides data on forecasts on the future three month T-bill rate. Calculating the forecast dispersion, (i.e. the standard deviation of these forecasts across forecasters) provides us with a proxy for uncertainty about future monetary policy. The SPF is conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The data is available on their web site (see http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/index.html).
Since the third quarter of 1981, after the release of the advance NIPA data for previous quarter, that is in the beginning of February, May, August, and November, the SPF has asked a group of about 30 to 50 people who make a living as forecasters on Wall Street or in business for their forecast of the three month T-bill rate one to five quarters into the future. Using these forecasts from each, we proxy for uncertainty about future monetary policy as the standard deviation of these T-bill rate forecasts one to five quarters ahead ( ) by calculating: Figure 2 shows the standard deviation of T-bill rate forecasts, our measure of forecast dispersion, one to five quarters ahead from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. For the aid of comparison the scale of the vertical axis of each graph is identical. Two things can be noted from figure 2. First, note that the standard deviation of forecasts was relatively higher in the early 1980s. Second, notice that the standard deviation of forecasts increases as the forecast horizon increases from two to five quarters ahead.
Descriptive statistics
As can be seen in figure 2 a lot of the volatility in the forecast dispersion occurs in the early 1980s, although this is less true for the four to five quarters ahead forecasts than the nearer term forecasts. Some of the volatility in the forecast dispersion perhaps can be attributed to the transition to lower inflation following the recessions of the 1980 and 1981-82. By the end of 1983 inflation had stabilized around 4% and we take this to be the end of the "first" transition to lower inflation. Table 1 As discussed above during the sample period the intention of monetary policy makers was to increasingly make monetary policy more transparent. If the Fed has gotten better at communicating its intentions, then there should be a greater consensus on the path of future monetary policy and hence lower forecast dispersions on average. Hence to the extent that the Fed was successful at increasing transparency, the goal of which presumably is to reduce the uncertainty about monetary policy, the forecast dispersions should decrease. This indeed seems to be the case. Hence while the data plot and sample statistics alone suggests that the Fed has been successful at reducing uncertainty about future monetary policy the empirical question is what else might account for the decline in forecast dispersion other than the increase in the transparency of monetary policy. Table 3 suggests it is necessary to control for that the absolute size of the changes in the Federal funds and the occurrence of financial crises when estimating the impact of transparency on the forecast dispersion of T-bill.
Single Equation Regression Models
To estimate the impact of increased transparency on the market participant uncertainty about future monetary policy the following regression is estimated: Estimates of equation (2) are reported in table 4 for the 1 to 5 quarter ahead forecast dispersions of the 3 month T-bill rate. In discussing the results we first focus on the control variables and then the transparency variables. Tables 4a to 4e report that the coefficient on the absolute value of the change in the Federal funds rate is statistically significant for all regressions for , for j = 1 to 4 and the 2 out of the 6 specifications for . The coefficients indicate that a 100 basis point change in the Federal funds rate increase the one quarter ahead forecast dispersion by 9 to 14 basis points or equivalently 50% to 70% of the sample mean for .
A similar magnitude result is obtained for the 2 quarter ahead forecast dispersion .
For the 3, 4 and 5 quarter ahead forecast dispersions, a 100 basis point change in the The Asian financial crisis resulted in a very large and statistically significant increase in the 1 quarter forecast dispersion : 373% to 400% of the sample mean. Now we will discuss our estimated impact of transparency on the T bill forecast dispersions. Table 4a to 4e report the coefficients on the transparency dummies, for k = 94, 95, 99 as well as the interaction of the dummies with the absolute value of the change in the Federal funds rate,
reduction in forecast dispersion of -7, -6 and -7 basis points respectively with only first estimate being statistically significant. Controlling for financial crises (Table 4a, Tables 4b and 4c give the results for the 2 and 3 quarter ahead forecast dispersions.
The results are similar to the 1 quarter forecast dispersions: the coefficients on for k = 94, 95, 99 not controlling for financial crises (Table 4b and 4c, column 2, 4, and 6) suggest a reduction in forecast dispersion of -9, -6 and +1 basis points respectively for and -9, -10 and +1 reduction in forecast dispersion for . The first two estimates for both and are also statistically significant. The results for the 4 and 5 quarter ahead forecast dispersions, given in Tables 4d and   4e 
μ , a necessary condition for identification of the structural shocks, t ε can be obtained by imposing n(n-1)/2 restrictions on the A matrix (see Enders (1995) or Hamilton (1994) The necessary condition to just identify the structural shocks is to impose restrictions on six of the elements of A. The traditional VAR approach to identification is assume the Choleski decomposition i.e. the assumption that the A matrix consists of zeros above the main diagonal. We will try to justify these restrictions structurally with the following assumptions: 1) Inflation is predetermined, and thus does not depend on contemporaneous values of the unemployment, the Federal funds rate or the T-bill rate forecast dispersion. The justification for this assumption is usual sticky wage and price model. With inflation predetermined, 0
2) The unemployment rate is assumed to respond contemporaneously to inflation shocks, Interestingly, Federal funds rate increases in response to a positive shock to T-bill rate forecast dispersion one, two and three quarters ahead, while for 4 and 5 quarters ahead the Federal funds rate response is essentially zero. This seems a bit counterintuitive: As shown in Table 3 , a positive shock to T-bill rate forecast dispersion seems likely to occur during a period of financial crisis (such as in the fall of 1998) which induces greater uncertainty about future interest rates. These results suggest that controlling for inflation and unemployment, such an increase in uncertainty is associated with restrictive monetary policy.
The graphs in the fourth row of figure 3 a to e, show for the response of the 1 to 5 quarter ahead T bill rate forecast dispersion for shocks to inflation, unemployment and the Federal funds rate. The initial impact of positive inflation shocks is to increase forecast dispersion from 1 to 4 ahead (statistically significant for 2 to 4 quarters ahead).
Positive unemployment shocks increase T bill rate forecast dispersion after the initial impact quarter by more than inflation shocks. Shocks to the Federal funds rate, initially decreases forecast dispersion for the 1 to 3 quarters ahead forecast dispersion, with the impact being insignificantly different from zero after the first quarter. Shocks to the Federal funds rate have little impact on the 4 and 5 quarters T bill forecast dispersion.
Overall the VAR results suggest that shocks to inflation, the unemployment rate and the Federal funds rate have a temporary impact on forecast dispersions and hence uncertainty about future monetary policy. This is consistent with the Fed's monetary policy transparency being successful in credibly communicating the future stance of monetary policy as well as the ultimate goals of monetary policy.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we first discuss the various sources of uncertainty that play an essential role Comments on Table 2: 1) The mean, median, minimum and standard deviation of the forecast dispersion (standard deviation of forecasts) increases with the forecast horizon. The maximum also increases going from the 2 to 5 quarters ahead forecast dispersion. 2) Unit root tests indicate that the 1 to 3 quarters ahead forecast dispersions are stationary. The 4 and 5 quarters ahead forecast dispersions appear to be nonstationary.
3) The sample autocorrelations indicate that the 1 quarter ahead forecast dispersions are serially uncorrelated. Lags 1 to 3 of the 4 and 5 quarters ahead forecast dispersions are not serially correlated, while the fourth lag is. However this series is nonstationary. Does this make sense? The 2 and 3 quarters ahead forecast dispersions are serially correlated. 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 Q statistic Response of STF1 to STF1
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